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NOTES
The Ninth Amendment's Role in the Evolution of
Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people.'
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court decision in Bowers v. Hardwick marked a significant
departure from the Court's previously controlling privacy precedents. 3 The
Bowers Court upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia criminal statute that
outlawed acts of sodomy between consenting homosexual adults. 4 Although
the state law extended even to intimate sexual relations within the privacy
of the home, Georgia had not violated Michael Hardwick's constitutional
right to privacy.5 The Court noted that its earlier decisions had never
"construed the Constitution to confer a right of privacy that extends to
homosexual sodomy .... 1-6
The Bowers decision gives civil libertarians reason to fear that the Supreme
Court may be retreating from or even abandoning its modern substantive
due process doctrine-the method by which the Court locates various rights
in the "liberty" provision of the due process clause. The Bowers majority
wrote that the "Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy
when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cogni-
zable roots in the language or design of the Constitution. ' 7 At least one
1. U.S. CONS?. amend. IX.
2. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
3. Privacy rights dealing with child rearing and education were recognized by the Court
in Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); with family relationships in
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); with procreation in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex
rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); with marriage in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967);
with contraception in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) and Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); and with abortion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. 478 U.S. 186. The Georgia law prohibited various forms of sodomy. The Bowers
Court, however, adhering to the particular facts of the case before it, had occasion to pass
only on the constitutionality of the statute's prohibition of homosexual sodomy.
5. Id. at 189.
6. Id. at 190; see also cases cited supra note 3.
7. 478 U.S. at 194.
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commentator has suggested that Bowers threatens "the theoretical under-
pinnings of the modern Court's substantive due process doctrine" 8 and may
thus "portend the second death of substantive due process." 9
Proponents of a broad judicial interpretation of the Constitution, appar-
ently concerned that the Supreme Court may no longer be willing to give
adequate protection to unspecified constitutional rights, are now urging a
privacy rights jurisprudence rooted in the ninth amendment. 0 They are
critical of the Bowers decision, insisting that judicial recognition of various
unmentioned privacy rights" is not illegitimate, but rather is constitutionally
compelled. Indeed, the language of the ninth amendment, they argue,
expressly authorizes courts to locate such rights, as well as any "others
retained by the people."' 2
Proponents of a narrow constitutional interpretation, by contrast, counter
that the ninth amendment does not empower courts to locate unmentioned
privacy rights. 3 These originalists, who advocate strict adherence to the
explicit language of the original document, applaud the Bowers Court for
refusing to "manufactur[e] privacy rights lickety-split.' '1 4 They condemn the
judicial practice of protecting privacy rights that have no specific textual
basis, and that are grounded only in the nebulous language of various
constitutional provisions, such as the ninth amendment and the due process
clause.' 5 Originalists thus maintain that the ninth amendment is merely a
rule of construction and not a "bottomless well in which the judiciary can
dip for the formation of undreamed of 'rights. ' " 6
This Note addresses the constitutional quandary of the ninth amendment's
proper adjudicative role. Part I provides a synopsis of the Supreme Court's
evolving fundamental rights doctrine, focusing on the Court's traditional
reliance on the due process clause as a source of unnamed constitutional
rights. Part II examines the ninth amendment's historical background and
inquires into the amendment's intended jurisprudential purpose. This section
concludes that the amendment was devised solely as a principle of construc-
8. Conkle, The Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 IND. L.J. 215, 216 (1987).
9. Id. at 215.
10. See Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment, 38 HASTINGS
L.J. 305 (1987); Mitchell, The Ninth Amendment and the "Jurisprudence of Original Inten-
tion," 74 GEo. L.J. 1719 (1986); Tribe, Contrasting Constitutional Visions. Of Real and
Unreal Differences, 22 H~Av. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 95 (1987).
11. See cases cited supra note 3.
12. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IX.
13. See Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1980); Caplan, The History
and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REv. 223 (1983).
14. Will, The Constitution and the Privacy Right, Indianapolis Star, July 3, 1986, at 14,
col. 5.
15. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: TI TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
16. Berger, supra note 13, at 2.
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tion and not as a source of judicial authority with which courts could
elevate unmentioned rights to constitutional status. Part III explores the
only Supreme Court case that makes any significant contribution to ninth
amendment jurisprudence and evaluates the conclusions reached in the
relevant separate opinions. 7 Finally, Part IV surveys some of the contem-
porary literature addressing the ninth amendment and reveals that many
authors seem more concerned with achieving "desirable" judicial results
than with adhering to proper constitutional processes.
I. A BRIEF ABSTRACT OF THE SUPREME COURT'S EVOLVING
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE
Judicial recognition of what the Supreme Court has called a constitutional
"right to privacy" commenced with its decision in Griswold v. Connecticut.,8
Griswold nullified a state statute that proscribed the use of contraceptives
by married persons.' 9 The Connecticut law extended to conduct within the
confines of the marital bedroom, the intrusion of which by state authorities
was considered no less than "repulsive" by the Supreme Court. 0 Accord-
ingly, the Court invalidated the state law by pointing to various "zones of
privacy" 2' that are "emanations from those [specific] guarantees" 22 of
individual rights expressly enumerated in the first eight amendments and
made applicable to the states via the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 23
Though Griswold is a watershed decision in the line of privacy cases, the
Court's method of locating fundamental rights by relying on the due process
clause is by no means unprecedented. During the first third of this century,
the Supreme Court routinely applied a similar substantive due process
analysis to economic rights. 24 Following its so-called Lochner doctrine, the
Court had determined that these economic rights included a general right
to engage in free enterprise, most notably the freedom to contract, without
the interference of the police power of the state.Y As a result, legislative
attempts to impose, for example, minimum wage or maximum hour regu-
17. For a discussion of the relevant separate opinions in Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, that
address the ninth amendment, see infra Part III.
18. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 486.
21. Id. at 484.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
25. See 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NowAK, & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.3, at 41, 43 (1986) [hereinafter R. ROTUNDA].
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lations were likely to be struck down as violations of the fundamental
constitutional right "of master and employe[e] to contract with each other
in relation to their employment. "26
Courts have long since discredited the Lochner series of cases. 27 In Justice
Holmes's famous Lochner dissent, he criticized his majority brethren for
imposing their own economic philosophy upon the state of New York. 28
Some thirty years later the Court itself questioned Lochner,29 the Great
Depression probably the catalyst for the doctrine's eventual demise.30 In
rejecting Lochner the Court implicitly acknowledged that the role of legis-
latures is to formulate and implement social policy, whereas the role of
courts is to defer to those determinations unless specific constitutional
provisions are thereby infringed. In the context of economic rights, since
the Constitution does not embody Adam Smith's version of laissez-faire
capitalism, no constitutional violation occurs when state legislatures choose
to deviate from that model.
Significantly, modern privacy rights cases have not reflected that same
animus of judicial deference that characterized the era following Lochner's
abandonment. For the most part, the current line of privacy cases, beginning
with Griswold, typifies the Court's willingness once again to locate funda-
mental rights within the broad and "open-ended" language of the due
process clause. Notwithstanding the Court's protestations to the contrary,3'
Griswold can thus fairly be said to represent a resurrection of substantive
due process.3 2 Indeed, the last twenty years have witnessed the Supreme
Court's further expansion of the list of unmentioned privacy rights that are
deemed to be of fundamental constitutional stature,3 3 a woman's right to
procure an abortion among the most noted and controversial.34 Current
constitutional protection of a variety of sexual and reproductive intimacies
is attributable to the Griswold case, making it a truly seminal decision.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE NNTH AMENDm-ENT
A. History
Under the Articles of Confederation, each sovereign state retained the
privilege of self-government, including, for example, the right to establish
26. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64.
27. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481-82; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937).
28. 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
29. West Coast, 300 U.S. at 392 n.1.
30. See 2 R. ROTUNDA, supra note 25, § 15.4, at 52-53. The Court's ultimate repudiation
of Lochner was complete with its decision in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.,
348 U.S. 483 (1955). Id. at 56.
31. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481-82.
32. Conkle, supra note 8, at 215.
33. See cases cited supra note 3.
34. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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legislation that protected individual liberties.35 Very little authority was vested
in the Continental Congress, which was an impotent body, unable to levy
taxes, assemble troops, or regulate commerce. 6 Splintered by many regional
differences and no national unifying force, the "union" suffered economic
instability as a result of numerous tariffs, trade barriers, and other com-
mercial rivalries among the states. 37 Similarly, individual states frequently
pursued a foreign affairs agenda that was incompatible with the interests
of the "national" government, 38 rendering the Articles ill-suited for the
conduct of foreign policy.3 9
The Constitutional Convention attempted to rectify the shortcomings of
the confederation by creating a stronger central authority, empowered
adequately to contend with "the exigencies of Government and the preser-
vation of the Union."' 4 But widespread fear of unchecked national power
led many to resist the Constitution's adoption. 4' This issue of allocating
power between the national government and the states soon evolved into a
great debate that pervaded every aspect of the Convention.4 2
There was little dispute that the envisioned national government ought
not to interfere with its citizens' key liberties. 43 Instead, the controversy
focused on how to achieve this result.44 The antifederalists were concerned
that, as the supreme law of the land, the Constitution would supplant and
thus annul the existing state bills of rights. 45 Consequently, they urged
passage of a federal bill of rights, fearing that individual liberties would be
meaningless unless the Constitution expressly declared them reserved.46 George
Mason, who had drafted the Virginia Bill of Rights, typified the antifed-
eralist position. 47 He sought a very weak central government and insisted
(albeit largely unsuccessfully) on explicit protections of individual liberties
in the new Constitution.
48
35. Caplan, supra note 13, at 236.
36. See 3 R. ROTUNDA, supra note 25, § 23.37, at 517-18.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Ti CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION,
S. Doc. No. 82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. XXXVIII (1972).
41. 1 A. BEVERXDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 342-47 (1916).
42. See A. COOKE, ALiSTAm CooKE's AMERICA 137 (1973).
43. Massey, supra note 10, at 309.
44. Id.
45. Caplan, supra note 13, at 239 n.65.
46. Id. at 239.
47. A. CooKE, supra note 42, at 140.
48. The original Constitution contained very few express protections of individual liberties.
Examples of those rights set forth include the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, U.S.
CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, and the protection against Bill of Attainder and ex post facto laws.
Id. at cl. 3.
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At the other end of the spectrum from Mason was Alexander Hamilton,
a staunch federalist, who advocated a powerful central government, and
who once even called for the abolition of the states altogether. 49 Federalists
believed that an enumeration of rights would be unnecessary and even
dangerous because any listing, necessarily incomplete, would imply that
unmentioned rights were intended to be surrendered to the federal govern-
ment. 0 Hamilton likewise objected to a bill of rights, commenting that such
a specification "would contain various exceptions to powers which are not
granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to
claim more than were granted [to the federal government]. For why declare
that things shall not be done which there is no power to do?"',
James Madison, proclaimed the "Father of the Constitution," proved to
be the Convention's great conciliator, helping to forge a consensus between
the federalists and the antifederalists. Madison "seized the principle that
made the American Constitution durable; . . .he had the instinct of the
balance valve, which yields steam protectively first to one side, then the
other. ' '52 He knew that states possessing too much power would swallow
up the central government (as had happened under the Articles).5 3 Yet, he
foresaw that a national government endowed with sufficient power to impose
its own will on defiant states would provoke civil war.5 4 Consequently,
Madison professed, the proper balance of state-versus-national power should
be drawn so that "the national government shall not coerce the states or
be their rival. Both exist to protect the [individual]. ' 55
Madison initially opposed the addition of a bill of rights because he felt,
as did Hamilton, that the federal government-a government of limited
powers-was not empowered to abridge individual liberties.5 6 Forever the
pragmatist, however, Madison soon "saw the writing on the wall": Sensing
that ratification might be jeopardized, he vowed to push for the enactment
of a bill of rights.17 Ultimately, the Constitution's ratification was secured,
at least in part, by the understanding that a bill of rights would be added
to ensure that certain fundamental rights of the people were beyond federal
government encroachment.5 1
Popular demand for a bill of rights prevailed, and following the Consti-
tution's ratification, Madison was responsible for drafting a set of proposed
49. A. COOKE, supra note 42, at 137-40.
50. Caplan, supra note 13, at 240.
51. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
52. A. COOKE, supra note 42, at 141.
53. Id. at 143.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Caplan, supra note 13, at 251-53.
57. Id. at 252-53.
58. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 427 (J. Gales & W. Seaton ed. 1836) (remarks of Elbridge Gerry)
[hereinafter ANNALS OF CONG.].
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amendments. 9 Submitting to antifederalist concerns, Madison endeavored
to secure, by explicit mention, certain fundamental rights that lay outside
the reach of the federal government's grasp.60 He also wanted to ensure
that other fundamental liberties, protected under state law, were not simply
abolished by the new Constitution, and so he further sought a "declaration
that defeated such a construction. ' 61
Madison's proposed declaration, which became the ninth amendment,
was proffered to guarantee that federal law would not supersede the rights
traditionally protected by the states simply because not all such liberties
were expressly enumerated in the new Constitution. 62 Madison defended his
proposed amendments, and what became the ninth amendment, by explain-
ing:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that by enumerating
particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those
rights which were not placed in that enumeration; and it might follow,
by implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were
intended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government, and
were consequently insecure. This is one of the most plausible arguments
I have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill of rights into
this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against [by the
inclusion of the ninth amendment]. 63
As eventually ratified by the necessary three-fourths of the several states,6
the ninth amendment, in its final version, provides that "[t]he enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people." 65
B. Jurisprudential Implications
The history and language of the ninth amendment demonstrate its appro-
priate role in fundamental rights cases. The amendment's function is well-
defined and limited. Its insertion into the Bill of Rights was intended simply
to assure those who opposed excessive central government authority that
unmentioned rights were not to be "construed" as ceded to the federal
government merely because they were not enumerated. The ninth amendment
does no more. It does not, for example, prevent these "other" rights from
ever being "den[ied] or disparage[d]." It provides only that unspecified
rights shall not be construed as having been denied or disparaged simply
59. Id. at 424.
60. Caplan, supra note 13, at 245.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 254.
63. 1 ANNA.ts or CONG., supra note 58, at 439.
64. U.S. CONST. art. V.
65. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IX.
1988]
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because certain rights (those that constitute the first eight amendments) were
expressly mentioned in the Bill of Rights.
The ninth amendment's role in fundamental rights jurisprudence is thus
twofold. First, the amendment in no way prevents Congress from affir-
matively acting to abridge any of these unmentioned rights, traditionally
protected by state law, so long as Congress acts within one of the express
or implied powers granted to it. Not only does the supremacy clause6 deem
legislative enactments of the Congress as paramount to those of the state
legislatures, but also the ninth amendment does not represent an independent
source of positive law. Rather, it serves merely as a rule of construction,
designed to prevent the inference that unspecified rights were automatically
relinquished to the federal goverrimerit.
Second, the ninth amendment does not empower the judiciary to overturn
state statutes that are thought to violate unspecified rights. The amendment
is not a repository of some amorphous set of fundamental rights. It was
devised to safeguard, not regulate, state legislation and to make sure "that
the individual rights contained in state law are to continue in force under
the Constitution until modified or eliminated by [subsequent] state enactment
''67
III. GRISWOLD'S CONTRIBUTION TO NINTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
Judicial exegesis of the ninth amendment has been extremely sparse in
Supreme Court case law. 61 Indeed, very few cases have ever purported to
forge a meaning and proper application of this "forgotten" 69 amendment,
and these attempts have involved mere dicta or the opinions of individual
Justices.70 A majority of the Court has never reached consensus on the
ninth amendment's jurisprudential function.
Certainly the most prolific judicial treatment of the ninth amendment
came, interestingly, in the Griswold case.7 1 Thus, not only did Griswold
signify the debut of the Court's modern "privacy" doctrine, but also the
66. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
67. Caplan, supra note 13, at 228.
68. Massey writes that "[o]nly seven Supreme Court cases prior to [Griswold] dealt in any
fashion with the ninth amendment: Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492-93 (1957); Woods
v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75, 94-96 (1947); Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 143-44
(1939); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 330-31 (1936); Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 511 (1857) (Campbell, J., concurring); Lessee of Livingston
v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469, 551 (1833) .... " Massey, supra note 10, at 305 n.1.
69. B. PATrERSON, TIE FORGOTTEN NnTH AMENDMENT (1955).
70. 2 R. ROTUNDA, supra note 25, § 15.7, at 80 n.10.
71. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring)
and id. at 507 (Black, J., dissenting).
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decision represents the Court's most important contribution to ninth amend-
ment jurisprudence. Two separate opinions offer a prolonged discourse by
a pair of Justices who propound conflicting theories of the ninth amend-
ment's role in fundamental privacy rights cases.
In his Griswold concurrence, Justice Goldberg "rescued [the amendment]
from obscurity''72 when he wrote that "the Ninth Amendment shows a
belief of the Constitution's authors that fundamental rights exist that are
not expressly enumerated in the first eight amendments and an intent that
the list of rights included there not be deemed exhaustive." 7 There is little
dispute with this reading of history-that "other" fundamental rights exist
in addition to those specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights. But his
analysis did not end here. Justice Goldberg's reasoning begged two key
questions: What are these "other" rights? and, more importantly, who is
to make that determination? Justice Goldberg answered that the federal
judiciary was obliged to identify these ninth amendment rights, which
became enforceable against the states by virtue of the amendment's incor-
poration through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 74
Justice Black, writing in dissent, fervently disagreed; he was critical of
the Court's opinion and Justice Goldberg's exposition of the ninth amend-
ment. Justice Black vehemently objected to the proposition that the federal
judiciary was the branch of government constitutionally suited to identify
the nature of these "other" rights. He stated:
[The Ninth] Amendment was passed, not to broaden the powers of this
Court or any other department of the [Federal Government], but as
every student of history knows, to assure the people that the Constitution
. ..was intended to limit the Federal Government to the powers granted
expressly or by necessary implication. If any broad, unlimited power to
hold laws unconstitutional because they offend what this Court conceives
to be the "[collective] conscience of our people" is vested in this Court
by the Ninth Amendment . . . , it was not given by the Framers, but
rather has been bestowed on th[is] Court by th[is] Court.7 '
Justice Black also challenged the view that the ninth amendment (said to
be incorporated by the fourteenth amendment's due process clause) could
be used by the Court to invalidate state legislation the Justices found to be
contrary to the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our people.''76
Justice Black properly understood that the ninth amendment is different
from the first eight. These earlier amendments contain an enumeration of
particular rights, which were enforceable against only the federal government
until the fourteenth amendment rendered most of these liberties enforceable
72. Berger, supra note 13, at 1.
73. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 492 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 492-93.
75. Id. at 520 (Black, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 518-19.
1988]
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against the states as well. The ninth amendment, however, is of another
breed. The ninth amendment does not contain substantive rights enforceable
against either state or federal governments. Instead, the amendment is simply
a principle of construction, intended to protect the individual rights that
exist by virtue of state law. 77 That is, the ninth amendment was drafted to
ensure that the identification and protection of these other rights are to
remain in the domain of state law, where they resided under the Articles
of Confederation.
Justice Goldberg's reading of the ninth amendment, though popular
among those who seek an expanded judicial role, is thus inconsistent with
the amendment's original understanding. To paraphrase Professor Raoul
Berger, "The notion that the [f]ramers, so fearful of the greedy expansive-
ness of power, would [intend the ninth amendment as an] unlimited grant
[of judicial authority] verges on the incredible." 78 Even John Hart Ely,
certainly no advocate of strict textualism, remarks that "read for what it
says the Ninth Amendment seems open-textured enough to support almost
anything one might wish to argue, and that thought can get pretty scary."
79
Hence, Justice Goldberg's conclusion that a broad constitutional right to
privacy can be deduced from the language of the ninth amendment is
unwarranted. He wrote that the ninth amendment "show[s] the existence
of other fundamental personal rights, now protected from state, as well as
federal, infringement.' ' In fact, the amendment supports no such conclu-
sion. Thus had Justice Goldberg unwittingly sanctioned the opening of
Pandora's Box.
IV. CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE
Encouraged by Justice Goldberg's misapprehension of history, several
recent commentators have steadfastly sought to disregard the ninth amend-
ment's true function, preferring instead an expanded meaning and appli-
cation in fundamental privacy rights cases.8 ' Lawrence Mitchell condemns
the Court's modern doctrine-its methodology, not its conclusions-for
locating new rights simply by stretching the meaning of explicitly protected
liberties.8 2 "The Court," says Mitchell, "has attempted to fit square pegs
into round holes, by forcing rights that might properly be protected by the
broad language of the ninth amendment into constitutional provisions where
no amount of pushing can comfortably make them fit." 83 Mitchell thus
77. See supra Part II.B.
78. Berger, supra note 13, at 22-23.
79. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 34 (1980).
80. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
81. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
82. Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1726-27.
83. Id. at 1727.
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implores the Court to abandon its prevailing subterfuge and to acknowledge
forthrightly its long-standing willingness to impose its own values upon the
people's elected representatives.
Similarly, Calvin Massey writes that "the ninth amendment was intended
to do more than secure unenumerated . . . rights[;] . . . it was also to
serve as a barrier to encroachment upon natural rights." ' 84 According to
Massey, a natural right is "generally recognized by a significant portion of
contemporary society as one inextricably connected with the inherent dignity
of the individual." 85 Massey's view is troubling. Not only is it contrary to
the lessons of history, but also it creates problems of implementation for
the judges who must apply it. How can courts reconcile, on the one hand,
judicial recognition of a general privacy right86-which would include, for
example, Michael Hardwick's claimed right to engage in homosexual
sodomya7-with Massey's stipulation, on the other, that ninth amendment
protection be afforded only those "natural" rights that are "generally
recognized by a significant portion of contemporary society . . .- ?18 That
the Georgia legislature has spoken by prohibiting various forms of sodomy
would seem to indicate that a majority of that state's citizenry finds the
practice immoral, offensive, or otherwise objectionable. To insist then,
under Massey's approach, that Hardwick's asserted sodomy right is worthy
of ninth amendment protection, notwithstanding the law proscribing its
practice, is at best contradictory.
Professor Laurence Tribe's contribution to ninth amendment scholarship
begins with the premise that "the [Supreme] Court must always act with
caution, not simply to avoid the accusation that it has . . . imposed its
own value choices in the Constitution's name, but to avoid the reality of
doing so."' 9 Tribe then chastises the Court for its Bowers ruling, describing
the decision as "a poor excuse for judicial legitimation of majoritarian
morality."' 9 Tribe adds: "To say [-as the Bowers Court seemed to-] that
unenumerated rights are deserving of [constitutional] protection only when
they are embraced by social consensus is to relegate them to a distinctly
lower and more suspect status, one barely entitled to respect and certainly
not to full veneration." 91
Tribe's comments are predictably eloquent, but they are unpersuasive.
Tribe knows that no claimed right to anything is a constitutional right
84. Massey, supra note 10, at 322.
85. Id. at 331.
86. Massey writes that "[t]he right of privacy ... is the constitutional right most closely
associated with the ninth amendment." Id. at 331.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 2-6.
88. Massey, supra note 10, at 331.
89. Tribe, supra note 10, at 105 (emphasis in original).
90. Id. at 107.
91. Id. at 106.
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unless reasonably implied by the document's language and design. Certainly
no specific textual basis can justify calling Hardwick's claim a constitutional
right. Nor does the ninth amendment elevate such a claim to constitutional
status. Absent the requisite textual grounding, Hardwick's asserted right is
necessarily "lower and [not] entitled to [constitutional] veneration." 92
All of the aforementioned authors seem preoccupied only with the Court's
achieving particular results. Perhaps with the best of intentions, they press
for judicial recognition of textually unjustified rights, irrespective of the
unconstitutional means the Court might choose to get there. Their urging,
for instance, that the state of Georgia ought not to concern herself with
the private intimacies of her citizens in their bedrooms is compelling. A
bad policy, however, is not necessarily an unconstitutional law. Many silly
statutes, perhaps regrettably, are nevertheless perfectly legal. Courts must
not use the ninth amendment as a panacea for a judicially incurable ill.
Indeed, nothing about the amendment enables the Court (legitimately) to
-Presto!-make appear a sodomy right that just ain't there. Justices must
show resolve by resisting the temptation to disregard the Constitution's
language and design, even while pursuing what may appear to be a "desir-
able" constitutional end. "The Constitution," wrote former Judge Robert
Bork, "is the judge's only mandate, and if he is wrong, if he denies the
right to govern of persons who have been elected as he has not been, then
he commits a mortal sin against the very constitutional order he is sworn
to defend." 93
Such admirable judicial obedience was demonstrated in Justice Black's
Griswold dissent. "I like my privacy as well as the next one," wrote Justice
Black, "but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that the government has
a right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional pro-
vision." 94 He continued:
My point is that there is no provision of the Constitution which either
expressly or impliedly vests power in this Court to sit as a supervisory
agency over acts of duly [elected] legislative bodies and set aside their
laws because of the Court's belief that the legislative policies adopted
are unreasonable, unwise . . . .or irrational. Th[is Court's] adoption
of such a loose .. .standard for holding laws unconstitutional . . .
amount[s] to a great unconstitutional shift of power to the courts which
.. .will be bad for the courts and worse for the country.95
Justice Black appreciated then precisely what threatens the American
constitutional system today. Well-meaning and doubtless sincere individuals
92. Id. at 106. "[Tribe is not] an unbiased and altogether detached commentator on the
subject of [Bowers. He] argued the case on behalf of Michael Hardwick in the Supreme
Court." Id.
93. Indianapolis Star, July 31, 1987, at 22, col. 1.
94. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 510 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 520-21.
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recognize many legitimate problems that confront contemporary society, but
these individuals have become discouraged with the inherently slow and
deliberate machinations of the democratic process. So they have resorted to
the courts and have attempted there to force through what they believe to
be the best solutions to society's troubles and what they believe can better
address the problems that society faces. Too often they have been successful
because courts have been all too eager to accommodate them.
Traditionally, courts obliged by resorting to the tenuous language of the
due process clause as a textual source of those unnamed rights the judges
found to be deserving of constitutional dimension. More recently, the
judiciary, to its credit, has responsibly shown a reluctance to attribute ever
more rights to the vague and inexplicit language of the fourteenth amend-
ment. This recent swing has prompted some commentators to urge the
Court to adopt a ninth amendment foundation to its fundamental privacy
rights cases. These commentators implore the courts to ignore the amend-
ment's proper role as a rule of construction and instead to give it substantive
content, thereby once again trying to justify the judicial protection of values
that lack specific textual grounding.
The American constitutional system was not designed to operate this way.
The Griswold line of cases represents clear examples of judicial law-making,
in which the Court seemed to be saying that "when the [language or
intention of the] Constitution is not clear, decisions of great moral moment
cannot be left to the people to decide through democratic processes but
must be imposed by the superior wisdom of the Court." ' 96 As a result,
fundamental rights analysis has recently involved little more than a deter-
mination by a majority of the Justices that certain individual rights, nowhere
mentioned in the Constitution, are nonetheless fundamental and worthy of
the judicial scrutiny dubbed 'strict' in theory, fatal in fact." '97
About this judicial circumvention of democratic procedures, Adam Smith's
words, though from a different context, are nevertheless appropriate: Judges
who would arrogate to themselves prerogatives that properly belong with
the People "would [assume] an authority . . . which would nowhere be so
dangerous as in the hands of [men] who had folly and presumption enough
to fancy [themselves] fit to exercise it." 98
As this nation enters its third century of constitutional governance, the
courts must never forget that message. Nor must the People ever let them.
CONCLUSION
The ninth amendment was drafted to ensure that the identification and
protection of "other" fundamental rights are to remain in the domain of
96. Neuhaus, Democratic Morality, NAT'L RV., July 18, 1986, at 47.
97. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAgv. L. Rv. 1, 8 (1972).
98. F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFu'Do 56 (1944).
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state law, where they resided under the Articles of Confederation. The ninth
amendment thus does not alter the intended balance of power between the
states and the federal government. The federal government may exercise
authority only to the extent that the Constitution confers such authority
expressly or by necessary implication.
To suggest, though-as some recent activist commentators have-that the
ninth amendment empowers the federal government, in particular the federal
judiciary, to overturn state statutes because they violate individual rights,
is to ignore the amendment's history and intended role. That role was to
ensure that states retained their sovereignty in protecting the integrity of
their citizens' liberties from abridgement by the federal government. These
activist scholars are critical of the Supreme Court's refusal to expand the
ninth amendment beyond its proper function. They rationalize that improper
judicial interference is justifiable because of the "desirable" social results
that are thereby achieved.
This view ignores that the United States is "a government of laws, and
not of men." 99 If the judiciary could disregard the strictures of the Con-
stitution, "there would be no law other than the will of the judge." 1 0 The
Republic cannot tolerate such governance-based only on the judge's per-
sonal predilections. Perhaps it cannot even survive.
GEOFFREY G. SLAUGHTER
99. "Novanglus" (pseudonym of John Adams) Papers, Boston Gazette, no. 7 (1774).
Adams attributes the quote to James Harrington. "Adams's use of the phrase gave it wide
circulation in America." BAnLETr'S FAmnmiA QUOTATIONS 381:1 nn.1, 2 (J. Bartlett ed. 1980).
100. R. Bork, Speech before the University of San Diego Law School (Nov. 18, 1985),
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